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Most German docs were written with `ue`/`ae`/`oe`/`ss` ASCII fallbacks (`fuer`, `aenderung`, `koennen`, `gemaess`) — relic from older toolchain constraints. Replaced 237 occurrences across 38 .md files with proper umlauts and ß so the docs read naturally. Substitutions are constrained to plain prose: fenced code blocks (```...```), inline code spans (`...`), markdown link targets `[..](..)`, and HTML comments are preserved verbatim. Path references like `docs/howto-erste-aenderung.md` keep their original (umlaut-replaced) filenames — only the surrounding prose is normalised. Tool: bin/fix-md-umlauts.py (idempotent — no-op on already-clean files). Re-runnable if ASCII fallbacks creep back in via copy-paste. Doc-link-check + doc-drift-check stay green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
82 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
82 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
# Anfragelimits (Rate Limiting)
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Letzte Aktualisierung: 2026-03-14
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## Ziel
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Brute-Force und API-Spam begrenzen, ohne Verfügbarkeit zu gefährden.
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## Technischer Kern
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- Service: `core/Service/Security/RateLimiterService.php`
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- Repository: `core/Repository/Security/RateLimitRepository.php`
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- Storage: `request_rate_limits`
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- `scope`, `subject_hash`, `hits`, `window_started_at`, `blocked_until`
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Wichtig:
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- Subject wird gehasht (SHA-256), kein Klartext-Key.
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- Verhalten ist fail-open bei Storage-Fehlern.
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## API-Limits (global)
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Durchgesetzt in `core/Http/ApiBootstrap.php`:
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1. IP-only (`api.ip`)
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- 120 Requests / 60s
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- Block 120s
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2. Token+IP (`api.token_ip`)
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- 300 Requests / 60s
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- Block 120s
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Bei Block:
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- HTTP `429`
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- `Retry-After`
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- Body `{"error":"rate_limit_exceeded"}`
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## Web-Login-Limits
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In `pages/auth/login().php`:
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1. Resolve-Phase pro IP (`login.resolve.ip`)
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- 25 Versuche / 600s
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- Block 300s
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2. Passwortphase pro E-Mail+IP (`login.password.email_ip`)
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- 5 Fehlversuche / 900s
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- Block 900s
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Erfolgreicher Passwort-Login setzt den Passwort-Scope zurück.
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## API-Login-Limits
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In `pages/api/v1/auth/login().php` (zusätzlich zu globalen API-Limits):
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1. IP (`api.auth.login.ip`)
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- 10 Fehlversuche / 600s
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- Block 300s
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2. E-Mail+IP (`api.auth.login.email_ip`)
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- 5 Fehlversuche / 900s
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- Block 900s
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Erfolgreicher API-Login setzt `api.auth.login.email_ip` zurück.
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## Remember-Token-Limits
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In `core/Service/Auth/RememberMeRateLimiter.php` (Memcached-basiert):
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1. Pro IP (`remember_rl:{ip}`)
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- 5 Fehlversuche / 900s
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- Block 900s (automatisch via Memcached-TTL)
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Erfolgreicher Auto-Login setzt den Counter zurück.
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Unterschied zu den DB-basierten Limits oben: Memcached statt `request_rate_limits`-Tabelle. Verhindert DB-Last bei Brute-Force gegen Remember-Cookies.
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## Smoke-Test
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1. API ohne Token >120 Requests/min gegen `/api/v1/*` -> `429` erwartet.
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2. Web-Login mit falschem Passwort >5 pro E-Mail+IP -> `429` erwartet.
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3. API-Login mit falschen Credentials wiederholt -> `429` erwartet.
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4. Remember-Cookie mit falschem Token >5 pro IP -> Auto-Login blockiert, Cookie gelöscht.
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