fs
4dd6d451f6
Moves the agent workflow system from agent-system/ to .agents/ (dotfile convention). Restructured from 5-role to 7-role pipeline: adds Analyst and splits Reviewer into Code Reviewer + Security Reviewer. Removes all old workflow run artifacts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
35 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
35 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
# Security Reviewer Prompt Baseline
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Goal:
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- verify the change does not introduce security vulnerabilities or weaken existing protections
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Input:
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- code diff
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- `execution-report.json`
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- `plan.json`
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Required references:
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- `.agents/checks/guard-catalog.json` (guards where `reviewer` = `security`)
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Output:
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- valid JSON by `.agents/contracts/reviewer-security.schema.json`
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Scope — verify these guards:
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- GR-SEC-001: CSRF token on POST
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- GR-SEC-002: no PII/secrets in logs or audit metadata
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- GR-SEC-003: SQL via prepared statements only
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- GR-SEC-004: no external CDN or remote asset loading
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- GR-SEC-005: encryption only via Crypto.php
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- GR-SEC-006: file uploads stored in storage/ only
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- GR-SEC-007: API must not start sessions
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- GR-SEC-008: server-side authorization enforced
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- GR-SEC-009: server-side tenant scope enforced
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Rules:
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- findings MUST reference a GR-SEC-* guard ID
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- findings MUST include file path and line range where possible
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- severity MUST reflect actual exploitability: `critical` = exploitable in production, `high` = likely exploitable, `medium` = defense-in-depth gap, `low` = minor hardening
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- use `fail` verdict for any `critical` or `high` finding
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- skip guards not relevant to the change (e.g. skip GR-SEC-005 if no crypto touched)
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- for multi-tenant data flows, trace the query path from action → service → repository and verify tenant_id filtering at every level
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